This paper presents a framework for modelling legislative deliberation in the form of dialogues. Roughly, in legislative dialogues coalitions can dynamically change and propose rule-based theories associated with dierent utility functions, depending on the legislative theory the coalitions are trying to determine.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates how to model legislative deliberation involving coalitions which express public interests. We follow [3] , which proposed a framework for moral dialogues, and we show how that work can be easily extended to legislation procedures.
We assume that the legislative procedure can be analysed into two dierent components: deliberation-the preparatory process of legislation, which runs in the form of a dialogue involving coalitions of agents-and voting [for a critique of this distinction, see 12] . Informally, the idea of legislative dialogue is the following:
• Given an initial theory T 0 -i.e., the current legislative corpus or a part of it-coalitions propose the theory that amends T 0 and that they would prefer; • Each theory is associated with an utility that measures the impact of the proposed changes given the utility of T 0 ; the intended Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for prot or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specic permission and/or a fee. reading is in terms of the consequence for the society if all agents would conform to such norms [8] ; • Coalitions deliberate in a dierent way depending on which of the above theories are employed to compute the utility; • We may have more rounds in which coalitions amend theories proposed earlier; • Coalitions are not xed during the debate.
Several rationality criteria can guide the legislative dialogue and the amendments proposed by coalitions. In addition to those considered in [3] -such as maximin principle and Pareto eciencywe show how to model Kaldor-Hicks optimality and two constraints for dialogues: maximising majority in coalitions, and minimising changes in the revision of the initial theory.
While there is a large literature using argumentation for modelling joint deliberation among agents [for an overview, see 1], to the best of our knowledge no systematic investigation has been developed combining means-ends rationality principles, theory revision in the law and formal dialogues. The proposal of Shapiro and Talmon [12] is a recent exception, which shares with us the idea that the legislative process proceeds in rounds of deliberation focused on editing a legal text, but those authors do not consider utility criteria guiding the procedure; on the contrary, they analyse voting outcomes-which we do not discuss here-upon a range of conditions, including reaching consensus, a Condorcet-winner, a time limit, or a stalemate.
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces to basic concepts, such as legislative theory, legislative coalition, and the coalition utility. Section 3 oers an analysis of some rationality criteria guiding legislative dialogues. Section 4 shows how legislative dialogues work. Section 5 illustrates additional constrains such as minimising legislative revision and maximising majorities.
BASICS
A corpus of legislative provisions in a given legal system can be dened as a set of legislative rules, a set which we call a legislative theory. In line with acknowledged literature (for a survey, see [2, 5, 11] ), we assume a logic language from which it is possible to build legislative theories. A legislative theory is thus made of a set rules and a superiority relation over the rules. D 1. A legislative theory is a tuple T = hR, �i where R is a set of rules, and � ✓ R ⇥ R is a superiority relation over the rules.
Rules have the form r : ψ 1 , . . . ,ψ n ) ϕ where ψ 1 , . . . ,ψ n , ϕ are literals (a literal is a propositional atom or its negation) and r is a label identifying the rule. When needed, we adopt the following convention: for any rule r , A(r ) and C(r ) denote respectively the set of antecedents of r and its consequent. In the rest of the paper, a set of legislative theories is denoted by T, and we may just say theory instead of legislative theory.
The legislative deliberation process involves a legislative body of lawmakers (such as the members of a parliament), which we generically call legislative agents, in short agents. During the deliberation process, agents can dynamically form coalitions. Typically, at the beginning of the deliberation, coalitions correspond to political-party groups in the legislative body. For brevity we will often speak of coalitions instead of legislative coalitions.
When legislative agents, i.e., the members of the legislative body, argue about theories to govern their own society, they form coalitions proposing theories that represent social interests corresponding to the utility resulting from such theories. 
Given a theory T and n agents, the function returns a vector of 2 n + 1 values, which dene the value of the theory for each possible coalition in A and where the rst value, conventionally, indicates the aggregated welfare for all coalitions. Thus, the overall coalitions' utility corresponds in the vector to projection π 0 (U (T )), while the value of the theory for any specic coalition i corresponds to the projection on the i-th element of the vector, U i (T ) = π i (U (T )).
In the remainder, U i (T ) denotes the utility of any coalition i 2 C. Also, we abuse notation and write U C (T ) to denote the overall coalitions' utility, i.e., U j (T ) where j = -k 2 C k. Accordingly, the overall coalitions' utility corresponds in the vector to projection π 0 (U (T )).
In line with ideas developed e.g. by rule utilitarianism [8] , we can determine what is the value of a theory (for each coalition, in our case, and based on the context in which the theory is used) with respect to some inference mechanism [see 7].
In particular, an approach to articulate the way in which utility springs from any theory T can be based on the utility of conclusions that follow from arguing on T .
For each literal l in a set Lit of literals and given a (possibly dierent) set of literals {l 1 , . . . ,l n }, we can dene a function λ that assigns for each coalition i in C an utility value, i.e., the utility that the state of aairs denoted by l brings to i in a context described by l 1 , . . . ,l n .
D 4. Let C and V be, respectively, a set of coalitions and an ordered set of values. A coalition literal valuation is a function
. . ,c m } is the set of conclusions of a theory T , then a coalition utility can be given by agglomerating the values of all conclusions:
where F i is a function/operator that agglomerates the individual values with respect to a coalition i into a single value. The agglomeration function F can simply correspond to the sum of individual valuations with respect to any coalition i [8] :
(2)
OBJECTIVES OF LEGISLATION
As any theory can be associated with a utility, we may identify particular theories. For example, one may consider agents' utility optimal theories, i.e., theories maximising the coalitions' utility, or (strong) 'Pareto optimal theories', i.e., theories for which no coalition can be made better o by making some coalitions worse o, or 'maximin optimal theories', i.e., theories maximising the utility of the worst o coalitions. Thus we may assume that any legislative debate has the objective of leading at the end (for the voting stage) to the best theory according to some rational standard based on utility considerations.
The following denitions adapt the intuition of [3] to the case of legislative coalitions.
D 5. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ⇤ is a coalitions' utility optimal theory in a set of theories T i there is no theory T 2 T such that
U C (T ) > U C (T ⇤ ). 1 D 6. Let C be a
set of coalitions. A theory T ⇤ is a Pareto optimal theory in a set of theories T i there is no theory
T 2 T such that U i (T ⇤ )  U i (T ) for all i 2 C and U j (T ⇤ ) < U j (T ) for some j 2 C.
D 7. Let C be a set of coalitions. A theory T ⇤ is a maximin optimal theory in a set of theories T i there is no theory
Other notions of eciency can be introduced in addition to those in [3] , such as Kaldor-Hicks eciency [9, 10] , which is very relevant in domains such as law and economics. As is well known, this notion claims to be more realistic than Pareto eciency, since it is extremely dicult to make any change without making at least one coalition worse o. Under the Kaldor-Hicks eciency, thus, a theory is ecient if those coalitions which are made better o could in theory compensate those which are made worse o and so produce a Pareto ecient outcome. This means that Kaldor-Hicks ecient theories are Pareto optimal, but the reverse is not true. Our formalism does not allow us to explicitly express the idea of compensation, but if one Pareto optimal theory T ⇤ exceeds the utility for some (but not all) coalitions j with respect to another Pareto optimal theory T 2 , then one could view T ⇤ as compensating a loss for some j in T :
set of coalitions. A theory T ⇤ is a Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory in a set of theories T i, for each Pareto optimal theory T ⇤ 2 T, there is a coalition i such that
Clearly, each Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory is Pareto optimal. We can now formulate the general problem of a legislative theory elicitation.
Given: a set of coalitions C and a set of theories T; Find: the best legislative theory T in T.
The problem can be specied. In fact, one may seek a coalitions' utility optimal theory, a Pareto optimal theory, a Maximin optimal theory, or a Kaldor-Hicks optimal theory.
LEGISLATIVE DIALOGUES
A legislative dialogue is the process through which coalitions propose their normative theories with the aim to improve on the current legislative corpus of provisions. The normative system resulting from the dialogue is taken to be justied and so it is suitable for the voting stage. Let us dene two simple operations for amending legislative theories. Here we consider two very basic operations [4, p. 165.], but more rened revisions can be adopted without aecting our overall framework [see 6]. D 9. Let T = hR, �i be a legislative theory. The contraction of T with respect to a set R of rules is:
where R ✓ R and
The expansion of T with respect to a set R of rules is:
where � 0 =� [{(r, s) | r 2 R, s 2 R and C(s) = ¬C(r )}.
Denition 9 identies the legal ways through which legislative theories can be amended: coalitions propose possible amendments in dialogues.
We can note that theory T k may be included in T k , possibly leading to some sort of equilibrium. However, we are not interested in computing equilibria as we deal with principles and not with moves as in standard game theoretic approaches. For this reason, we rely on dialogues and not on games, though our dialogues may be seen as mirroring such games.
A dialogue is sound if, and only if, the choice function is sound. We concentrate on a few sound Choice functions, each of them combining a well established rational criterion with legal ways in which legislation can be amended. Rational criteria may include 
E (R ). Let us consider three xed coalitions: coalition i 1 representing people with high incomes because of their high salary, coalition i 2 representing those with high incomes because of tax evasion, and coalition i 3 representing those with low incomes. Suppose the initial theory T 0 comprises the following:
R = {r 1 : UpperClass ) RaiseTax,
Consider, for example, coalition i 2 and assume that the λ function is dened as follows (we omit the literals that are not logically derived):
λ(i 2 , SeverePunishment, E(T )) = −10 λ(i 2 , ¬Subsidies, E(T )) = −5 λ(i 2 , PoorCountry, E(T )) = −2 λ(i 2 , LowerClass, E(T )) = 0 λ(i 2 , TaxEvader, E(T )) = 18.
CONSTRAINTS ON LEGISLATION
In Section 3 we have identied some objectives of the legislative procedure, if coalitions are assumed to adopt some type of meansends rationality. However, deliberative procedures usually also assume that some basic constraints apply to them. We focus on the principle of majority-driven debate and of minimal revision.
Majority-driven Coalitions in Legislation
We should notice that Denition 10 does not require that coalitions are xed in the dialogue, but simply that at each turn in the dialogue some coalitions individually propose some revised theories. Hence, if the legislative body works on the basis of the majority principle as applied to the agents forming the coalitions, it is obvious that such coalitions could change during the dialogue. 
In other words, a coalitions' majority optimal choice ensures that each theory selected at each turn is proposed by a majoritarian coalition in A (since the size of the coalition i j must exceed the half of the size of the set of agents). Denition 16 works with simple majority, but other requirements such as supermajority or unanimity can be easily implemented. a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } with the following coalitions:
E (R ). Let A be the set of agents:
A = {a 1 ,i 1 = {a 1 } i 2 = {a 2 , a 3 } i 3 = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } i 4 = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 }
Assume four additional theories with the following utility vectors:
If Pareto choice and coalitions' majority optimal choice are jointly adopted, the dialogue could run as follows:
Minimal Revisions in Legislation
Finally, another constraint could require to minimise the revision of the initial theory, in order to keep legislative revision as simple as possible. In theory revision for the legal domain the idea of minimal change has been widely investigated [for an overview, see 4, 6] . Here we simply focus on minimal contraction or expansion with respect to the set R of rules that are removed from, or added to T 0 : 
The utility distribution is thus [2, 1, 1], Suppose that coalitions are modelled through a coalitions' utility maximising choice function and imagine that
Here the utility distribution is [12, 6, 6] . 
OPTIMISING LEGISLATIVE DIALOGUES
The use of dialogues and their iterative nature suggest some dierent (search) strategies to nd an optimal theory in a set of theories.
Coalitions' Utility Optimising Dialogues
For the terminal theory of a dialogue to be coalitions' utility optimal in the theories proposed in the dialogue, it is sucient that the dialogue has a coalitions' utility maximising choice function whose output theory T k is always included in the proposed theories T k .
.K with a coalitions' utility maximising choice function is coalitions' utility optimal in the set of theories T d proposed in the dialogue if for any
However, the terminal theory may not be a strict 'improvement' of T 0 . Therefore, one may consider dialogues to elicit coalitions' utility optimal theories based on the idea of improving theories. In other words, if there exists no improvement in a dialogue then the initial theory remains the optimal theory, and a legislative dialogue is not necessary to nd the optimal theories.
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Optimising Dialogues
Dialogues can be similarly tuned to elicit Pareto optimal theories. 
As the terminal theory may not be an improvement of T 0 , we can consider Pareto improving theories, i.e., theories leading to a utility gain, without any coalitions being made worse o. Similar results can be given for Kaldor-Hicks optimality.
Maxmin Optimising Dialogue
Similarly to coalitions' utility and Pareto improving choice functions, maximin can be accommodated in dialogues. 
Improving Majorities
We have previously mentioned that dialogues aim at maximising majorities by reconguring coalitions during the debate. 
SUMMARY
In this paper we extended Governatori et al. [3] 's framework to the legal domain for modelling legislative deliberation. First of all, we assumed that the legislative procedure can be analysed into two dierent components: deliberation-the preparatory process of legislation, which runs in the form of a dialogue involving coalitions of agents-and voting-which was not discussed here.
The idea of legislative deliberation consists in revising the current legislative corpus or a part of it, where agents's coalitions propose in a dialogue legislative theories that amends such corpus. Each revision is associated with an utility that measures the impact of the proposed changes. Several rationality criteria have been described according to which coalitions deliberate.
